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Abstract 
It is common practice to assign revenue to accomplish specific governmental tasks in general, 
and to provide transport infrastructure in particular. However, neither the literature in public 
administration nor in public choice has reached a consensus about the effects that 
earmarking has on efficiency. Building on earlier public choice models, we argue that this 
mechanism prevents budget debates from occurring and reduces the incentives for ministers 
to monitor the colleagues whose budgets are financed by earmarked revenues. These latter 
tend to overuse public resources, thus increasing inefficiency. A stochastic frontier model fed 
with data from Swiss cantonal ministries of transport from 2000 to 2016 tests this hypothesis. 
The results reveal a negative effect of earmarking on efficiency. For every 1,000 additional 
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Swiss francs per capita financed out of an earmarked fund, the input requirement increases 
by 5.4 percent on average. 
Keywords: Roads, Earmarked revenue, Efficiency, Public Choice, Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Background 
This paper argues that dedicating specific public revenues for particular expenditure purposes has 
a negative effect on the efficiency of public service provision. This earmarking mechanism is 
sometimes called ring-fenced funds, recycled revenues, segregated funding, autonomous revenue 
streams, pork-barrel spending, tax hypothecation, or lockboxing (Jackson, 2013). It is used in various 
policy areas, including transport infrastructure, telecommunication, security, health, education, 
environment, and social security, as reported by Roberts (2002) for the US or McCleary (1991) for other 
countries.  
A government is efficient compared to its peers if it provides the maximum quantity or quality of 
public services (i.e. outputs) given its bundle of expenditures (i.e. inputs). In contrast, a government 
provides its services inefficiently if, for instance, it overspends for excessively large offices or 
unproductive programs, et cetera. In technical terms, the state entity’s efficiency results from the 
distance to the benchmark, which is the production frontier consisting of the optimal combinations of 
inputs and outputs.  
We purport that earmarking interferes in budget negotiations between ministers sitting in the 
executive branch of the government and later in parliament. The earmarked revenue is not only 
excluded from any bargaining, but tasks funded in such a way and their supervisory ministers are also 
less likely to be overseen by other ministers. Therefore, earmarking prevents reciprocal checks across 
and between ministers and ministries. This premise motivates our main research question: Does 
earmarking, together with other revenue characteristics, negatively influence the efficiency of road 
infrastructure provision, and to what extent? Answering this means first measuring the quantitative 
importance of earmarked funds. Afterwhich, the effect on efficiency can be econometrically estimated 
by combining several output and input variables to approach the efficiency and by including revenue 
characteristics as environmental factors. In our model calibrated for the Swiss cantons, earmarking has 
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a negative influence on efficiency. For every 1,000 additional Swiss francs per capita financed out of 
an earmarked fund, the input requirement increases by 5.4 percent on average.  
This finding sheds light on the existing literature which so far has remained divided and inconclusive 
in trying to connect earmarking and efficiency. Among the various kinds of government revenues, 
earmarked ones were early recognised as bearing similarities to transfers or debt financing. Oates 
(1985) subsumed them under the wider term of fiscal illusion and argues that revenue characteristics 
might influence the creation of a government budget. 
For its part, classic public administration literature claims that earmarking harmfully affects 
efficiency because a predefined budget allocation limits the government’s flexibility to maximize the 
social welfare (Deran, 1965; Lee and Wagner, 1991). Non-earmarked revenues give the benevolent 
bureaucrat the possibility to optimally allocate ressouces (Schönenberger, 2013). By contrast, the 
public choice theory considers earmarking a disciplinary tool which hinders politicians from abusing 
their influence over the budgetary process and fosters a more efficient provision of public services. 
According to Buchanan (1963), earmarking makes it possible to redress tie-in sales offered by the 
government under general fund financing, as the voter has a direct influence on budget allocation. In 
this sense, it can even help fight rigid budgeting procedures (Bird, 1982). Linking a levy to a specified 
public service provides the administration with more accurate information about the actual demand 
for a public good since the beneficiary pays for his own utility (Bird and Jun, 2005). Enforcing 
earmarking can be seen as a substitute for a direct user charge if this latter is not feasible (Lee and 
Wagner, 1991).  
The empirical evidence is very scarce and patchy. To the best of our knowledge, indeed only 
Martínez (2014) sets the efficiency of public service provision as the dependent variable and examined 
the influence of earmarked revenue stemming from oil royalties on the provision of local public goods 
in Colombian municipalities. The results show that increases in the general budget boost public goods 
indicators at least ten times more than an equivalent increase in earmarked revenues. Other empirical 
contributions in this field examined the effect of earmarked revenues on public expenditure. They 
mostly focus on U.S. states and on a limited number of government functions. In sum, these studies 
argue that earmarking indeed increases expenditure for the concerned function of government, but it 
partly crowds out the existing general fund financing and in so doing also leads to higher spending for 
other functions (Nesbit and Kreft 2009, Afonso 2015). Yet, since higher expenditures by no means 
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automatically lead to inefficiency, the results of these studies do not substantially contribute to the 
question approached here. Nevertheless, being aware of a possible crowding-out effect is important 
in order to understand why the Swiss case is a particularly interesting one for analysing earmarks – as 
outlined in Section four. 
Our study applies stochastic frontier analysis for the first time as a way to measure the effect 
earmarking has on efficiency in road infrastructure provision; the technique has been used before in 
connection with efficiency concerns other than earmarking (see Kalb 2009; Seifert and Nieswand 
2014; Widmer and Zweifel 2012). The twenty-six Swiss cantons (the institutional equivalent of 
provinces or states in other countries) provide a fertile empirical ground for two reasons. First, they 
have relatively detailed and accurate data for the sample period of 2000 to 2016. Second, they enjoy 
considerable fiscal autonomy, which means a large degree of variation in many areas. The cantons face 
minimal federal restrictions in terms of their tax systems, indebtedness, or how they allocate their 
budgets. Consequently, cantons have considerable latitude in deciding which services they want to 
provide to their citizens and to what extent.  This pronounced autonomy also manifests in a high 
degree of self-financing of public services, including road construction and maintenance.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes in detail a model in which the 
efficiency of the public service provision is hindered by what we call the “debate prevention” induced 
by earmarked revenues. The third section introduces stochastic frontier analysis and explains how the 
method estimates the distance to the production frontier by combining inputs and outputs in a context 
of environmental factors. Following that, the fourth section presents how we measure earmarking for 
financing the road infrastructure provision in the Swiss cantons and the quantitative importance of the 
phenomenon over seventeen years for twenty-one out of twenty-six cantons. The other data used to 
compute the stochastist frontier are also specified in this section. Section 5 presents the estimation 
results and provides the answers to our research question. The final section is devoted to the 
conclusions drawn from the study and to the relevance of these results for policymakers. 
A Theoretical Model of Debate Prevention 
The debate prevention model follows along from the idea of electoral competition where 
candidates and incumbents can obtain positive rents if the two politicians are no perfect substitute for 
each other because of an ideological bias. Without specifying what they mean exactly by it, Persson 
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and Tabellini (2002) argue that transaction costs determine the amount of rent politicians can divert 
from the total budget. We extend this model in two ways. First, we specify transaction costs as being 
the effort politicians make to hide rent appropriation, which in turn depends on the monitoring effort 
of other ministers. Since rents generate no public service, they lead to overspending and thus to 
inefficiency. Second, the debate prevention model is oriented to a political system in which the political 
executive is organized as a governing council with elected ministers sharing equal power, each of 
whom manages a ministry. This is the case in the Swiss system on all three state layers. However, the 
model is easily transferable to a mayoral government or to a president who presides over a cabinet of 
ministers. Furthermore, we assume that the earmarked funds are exogenous, which comes close to 
the Swiss reality in the short run.  
The governing council plays an important role in allocating resources because its members engage 
in various rounds of debate with respect to the share each ministry receives of the total government 
budget. In order to maximize his or her share of the total budget (Niskanen 1975), ministers mount 
monitoring efforts to question the proposed programs and budget claims of colleagues. This intense 
screening increases the probability of revealing weaknesses and finding potential savings in the 
proposed policy programs, outcomes which free up the claimed funds and bring them back to the 
negotiation table. Thus, more monitoring means higher transaction costs for siphoning off monetary 
rents. 
Now, imagine that minister A manages an earmarked fund specifically designed to finance one 
particular task, for which the minister is solely responsible. During all the budget debates, the 
budgetary fraction behind minister A ’ s earmarking wall remains undisputable. Out of A ’ s 
requested budget, there is only a small part up for discussion and this alleviates any incentive to 
monitor A’ s policy programs in the first place. Being less monitored (i.e. facing lower transaction 
costs to achieve rents), minister A enjoys a larger leeway to generate budgetary slack and consequently 
she offers the services within her domain less efficiently (she uses more inputs to generate the same 
amount of outputs).1 In general, the hypothesis is that the larger the share behind earmark-walls, the 
less incentive the ministers have to monitor each other and the less efficient the public service 
provision. Put differently, a high level of earmarked revenue share partly releases ministers from 
debating during the budgetary process. 
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Methodology 
There are several possibilities to econometrically combine inputs, outputs, and environmental 
variables with the intention to explain efficiency variation. Given the available data, a distance function 
is the most suitable approach here. Not only does it make it possible to separate random noise from 
inefficiency, it also introduces various inputs and outputs (Shephard 1953). The input distance function 
can be derived from the transformation function 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝒙𝒙𝜃𝜃,𝒚𝒚) = 1, where 𝒚𝒚 is a vector of 𝑞𝑞 outputs, 𝒙𝒙 
a vector of 𝑤𝑤 input costs, and A covers variables or functions that affect the entire production but not 
the inputs or outputs individually; the efficiency term 𝜃𝜃 lies between zero and one (Kumbhakar 2012). 
The transformation function describes how the inputs, deflated by an efficiency factor, produce a set 
of outputs. We impose the standard assumption of input homogeneity of degree one, which means 
that if the inputs are multiplied by some factor, then the output is multiplied by some power of this 
factor.2 Homogeneity of degree one in inputs enables us to rewrite the above transformation function 
as 𝜃𝜃𝑥𝑥1𝐴𝐴(𝒙𝒙�,𝒚𝒚) = 𝐴𝐴 where 𝒙𝒙� =
𝒙𝒙
𝑥𝑥1
, i.e. all 𝑤𝑤 inputs except the first are divided by the arbitrarily chosen 
input 𝑥𝑥1.3 Taking logs and rearranging yields ln𝑥𝑥1 = − ln 𝐴𝐴(𝒙𝒙�,𝒚𝒚) + ln𝐴𝐴 − ln𝜃𝜃. Define ln𝐴𝐴 ≔ 𝑎𝑎 and 
𝜃𝜃 ≔ exp (−𝑢𝑢) to get the generalized input distance function of ln 𝑥𝑥1 = 𝑎𝑎 − ln𝐴𝐴(𝒙𝒙�,𝒚𝒚) + 𝑢𝑢. 4  
In order to be able to estimate the parameters of interest, we first need to specify the functional 
form of 𝐴𝐴(𝒙𝒙�,𝒚𝒚). Given the limited number of observations, the Cobb-Douglas specification seems 
appropriate as it holds the number of parameters to be estimated at a reasonable level. At the same 
time, it is rather restrictive in terms of the elasticity of substitution and scale properties. Hence, we 
also apply the translog specification. Second, the econometric estimation involves stochastic noise 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  
for each individual 𝑖𝑖, which also needs to be added to the estimation equation. Taken together, the 
stochastic noise and the inefficiency constitute the error term of the estimation equation, i.e. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 =
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 . To identify both the noise term 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖  and the inefficiency term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  properly, they need to be 
individually specified. While the noise term is usually assumed to follow an independent and identical 
normal distribution with a zero mean, pondering the distribution of the inefficiency term encouraged 
researchers to come up with numerous models. For instance, the inefficiency term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 could be half-
normally or truncated-normally distributed. The different approaches vary particularly in the number 
of parameters to be estimated. More parameters mean more flexibility but also add complexity to the 
estimation. To incorporate environmental variables into the model, we parametrize the mean of the 
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inefficiency term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖. Thereby, efficiency is conditioned on contextual factors (Kumbhakar, Wang, and 
Horncastle 2015).  
Third, as in other econometric issues, the exploitation of panel data opens up new possibilities for 
isolating further parameters or identifying the parameters of interest more appropriately. Having 
several observations of the same individual also makes it possible to exclude fixed effects. Both, the 
true random- and the true fixed-effect model splits the error term into three parts, i.e. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (Greene 2005). The term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 thereby entails only time-variant inefficiency. On one hand, taking all 
persistency out of 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 eliminates the risk of confounding some unobserved individual fixed effects 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  
with time-persistent inefficiency. On the other hand, a latent time-persistent inefficiency remains 
unidentified too. The aim here is to explain efficiency differences based exclusively on time-varying 
environmental variables, which renders time-persistent efficiency estimates redundant. The input 
distance functions specified as Cobb-Douglas (CD) and translog (TL) are estimated with the true 
random- and the true fixed-effect model as follows: 
CD:  ln(𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟
𝑞𝑞
𝑟𝑟 ln(𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗=2 ln �
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑥𝑥1𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
� + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
TL:  ln(𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ln(𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑟𝑟 ln(𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ln(𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟  











+∑ ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 ln �
𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑥𝑥1𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
� ln(𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑘𝑘=2𝑗𝑗=2 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(2) 
where 𝔼𝔼�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 0  [random-effect] or 𝔼𝔼�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖|𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� ≠ 0 [fixed-
effect] 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∽  𝑁𝑁+(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2) with  𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜹𝜹′𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∽  𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2) 
Similar to the random- and fixed effects models of linear regression models, the true fixed-effects 
model is less efficient but still consistent even if the fixed effect is correlated with the dependent 
variable. Hence, in order to impose fewer restrictions on the model, the true fixed-effects model serves 
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here as a standard estimator whereas we apply the true random-effects estimator as a robustness 
check. In both models, the inefficiency term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indicates the percentage overuse of inputs owed to 
inefficiency. After the estimation of Equation (1) and (2), the technical efficiency can be obtained 
through 𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝔼𝔼[exp (−𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)|𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] (Battese and Coelli 1988). 
Interpreting the coefficients of the environmental variables (𝜹𝜹) is not straightforward. As they 
appear in a non-linear fashion in the estimation equation, a direct interpretation would be misleading. 
Wang (2002) and Kumbhakar and Sun (2013) provide the necessary modifications to obtain the 
marginal effects on inefficiency.5 They also show that the effects are monotonic, using the specification 
we apply here. In other words, even if the coefficient per se might not be informative without 
modifications, its sign is. Finally, it is crucial to recognize that the coefficients link the environmental 
variables with the inefficiency 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. A positive coefficient therefore means that the respective variable 
affects efficiency negatively. 
Data 
To test our hypothesis with the aid of stochastic frontier analysis, we examined the expenditures 
for road construction and maintenance in Swiss cantons between 2000 and 2016. This analysis 
particularly benefits from the latitude cantons have in defining their expenditures (inputs) and the 
extent of public service provision (outputs) in both road infrastructure on the one side and the 
different contexts (environmental variables) within which the cantons function on the other side. 
In terms of output, the construction and maintenance of roads is usually approximated by the road 
length (da Cruz and Marques 2014; Narbón-Perpiñá and De Witte 2017; Widmer and Zweifel 2012). 
To account for attrition, the number of cars reflects the frequency and intensity of use of these roads 
(Widmer and Zweifel 2012). As a qualitative measure of roads, the number of accidents due to bad 
road quality serves as a proxy (Kalb 2009).6 In line with the literature, the input side is quantified 
through expenditures instead of individual inputs and their prices (Balaguer-Coll, Prior, and Tortosa-
Ausina 2007; Seifert and Nieswand 2014; Widmer and Zweifel 2012), with total expenditures split into 
outlays for goods and services, personnel, and financial and capital purposes. Calculating deflated 
values guarantees comparability between the years. Together with an assumption of constant input 
prices among all observations, the results show the effect on technical instead of cost inefficiency 
(Seifert and Nieswand 2014; Kumbhakar, Wang, and Horncastle 2015).  
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The main concerns with respect to environmental variables being the earmarked revenues requires 
some knowledge of how the respective accounting mechanism operates. It is designed to ensure 
earmarks are used only for a specific predefined purpose.7 For each specifically financed task – in our 
case for road provision – an individual account called an “earmarked fund” or “special financing” 
records both the earmarked revenue and the corresponding expenditure. The claimed exclusive use 
can thus be disclosed in full transparency. Simultaneously, earmarked revenues enter the general 
financial statement, subsumed under total revenues. Likewise, the corresponding expenditures form 
part of the total expenditures presented in the annual financial statement. However, in the year-end 
reporting, the earmarked revenues and their corresponding expenditures are given as net figures 
independent of all other transactions. If their balance is positive (i.e. if earmarked revenues are larger 
than corresponding expenditure), then a credit note increases the respective account in the balance 
sheet (i.e. the earmarked fund). In case of a negative balance, the account decreases by the amount 
of the deficit (see Figure 4 in the appendix for an illustration). Putting these two cases together implies 
not only that the earmarked revenue must be exclusively used for its specified purpose, but also that 
no other funding source is made available for that purpose. In other words, a crowding out of financial 
resources from the general budget through insufficient earmarked revenue is not possible in the Swiss 
cantonal system.  
Unfortunately, there are no unified statistics about the use of the special financings, which is why 
we directly gathered our data from the only data source available, the annual cantonal financial 
statements. We use the expenditures funded by the stock of the earmarked fund (i.e. expenditures 
through earmarked funds) in per capita terms as a variable which approximates the phenomenon of 
earmarking. Figure 1 shows the importance of earmarking in the 26 Swiss cantons from 2000 to 2016 
(abbreviations refer to specific cantons). Expenditures through earmarked funds remained roughly 
stable between 2000 and 2007. They began increasing after the fiscal equalization system was 
modified in 2008, leading to greater variation between the cantons. On average by 2015 and 2016, 
earmarked expenditures accounted for about 30 percent of total expenditures for road construction 
and maintenance.  
Alongside the debate prevention theory, a fiscal illusion created by other revenue characteristics 
may affect the efficiency of public service provision (Oates 1985). For instance, Wyckoff (1990) argues 
that the bureaucrat might successfully pocket rents from intergovernmental transfers. 
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Figure 1 – Relevance of earmarked funds 
Grants from other state entities would then be a source of voter misperception of the government 
budget, which the bureaucrat could in turn exploit for his or her own use. These rents drive a wedge 
between the inputs (i.e. taxes) and the outputs (i.e. the public service provision), resulting in a lowered 
efficiency. A slack-maximizing bureaucrat is therefore a possible explanation for why grants are not 
transferred to the voter via reduced taxes while nevertheless leading to higher expenditures. The 
notion that money sticks where it hits came to be known as the flypaper effect (Courant, Gramlich, 
and Rubinfeld 1979). We capture this by introducing transfer receipts in our regression. 
Certainly, grants are not the only source of possible misperceptions of the government budget, and 
Wyckoff's (1990) chain of reasoning also works with other sources of fiscal illusion. First, tax 
composition entails tax complexity. A highly complex tax structure makes it difficult for voters to 
maintain an overview of the total amount paid to the government. Thus, a higher revenue complexity 
purportedly reduces efficiency (Dollery and Worthington 1996). To measure tax complexity we follow 
Carroll (2009) in using the relative importance of each source 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 to calculate a normalized Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index nHHi.8 Second, the income elasticity of the revenue system refers to the 
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According to this theory, people are more aware of the tax rate than of their actual tax bill. If their 
income grows and they pay more due to tax progression, voters perceive the tax bill to be lower than 
when the tax rate increases (Oates 1975). As long as public expenditures can be funded without raising 
the tax rate, people will not oppose them (Dollery and Worthington 1996). The presumption is that a 
strongly progressive tax will have a more negative effect on efficiency than a flat tax. Tax progressivity 
is measured as a logarithmic parameter; the stronger the progressivity, the higher the values.9 Third, 
voters may experience debt illusions if the price they pay today does not fully reflect the true cost of 
the public service. 
We also control for other confounding factors. If the obstacles to participating in the democratic 
process are low, the incentives for citizens to exercise their control function are higher (Widmer and 
Zweifel 2012; Geys, Heinemann, and Kalb 2010). This is operationalized using an index for financial 
referenda (Frey and Stutzer 2000). While the possibility of a referendum provides incentives to 
contribute to the political process, the participation rate in elections can also be measured directly. 
The expected effect on efficiency is also positive. Based on assumptions rather than deep theory, 
several studies have assessed the effect of party affiliation on efficiency, with the evidence generally 
showing that left-wing parties have a negative effect on efficiency (Kalb 2010; Borge, Falch, and Tovmo 
2008). We control for political parties at both executive and legislative levels. Without a definite 
prediction of its effect, we follow similar studies controlling for the proportion of foreigners (Bönisch 
et al. 2011). Finally, we include the length of municipal and national roads as control variables, given 
that, within a canton, a long federal road system – funded by the central government rather than the 
subnational jurisdictions – will absorb more traffic and thus make cantonal expenditures per kilometer 
of road shrink. This variable also controls for potential scale effects, as we measure it as kilometers of 
road per square kilometer of the canton.10 Table 2 in the appendix provides the descriptive statistics. 
Indeed, some cantons operate in a more challenging context than others; road construction may be 
more costly, for example, due to the hilliness of certain cantonal terrains. However, these factors are 
not included among the environmental variables, because they are time-invariant and hence absorbed 
by the individual fixed-effect of the applied models. 
Results 
Table 1 (see appendix) shows the coefficient estimates, starting with the TFE model with TL 
specification (see Equation (2)) as the baseline regression (Model I).11 
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The top row of coefficients lists the inputs (I) and outputs (O) with the respective elasticities as 
well as the intercept. Note that all inputs and outputs are logarithmic and normalized by their mean 
value such that they can be interpreted as an average elasticity for all cantons and years. The second 
group represents the environmental variables that influence the inefficiency variance (the 𝜹𝜹  of 
Equation (2)), where the bold variables are those capturing the revenue characteristics discussed in 
the theory section 2 and the data section 4. The third group provides information about the 
stochastic noise (i.e. 𝜎𝜎�𝑣𝑣), the inefficiency variance (𝜎𝜎�𝑢𝑢) and the signal-to-noise ratio (?̂?𝜆). A higher 
ratio is desirable as the inefficiency variance is necessary to identify the effects of the environmental 
variables (Badunenko, Henderson, and Kumbhakar 2012). In this respect, the TRE Model (II) is the 
best as its ratio exceeds 1. The last group provides further standard information. 
Focusing first on the inputs and outputs, only a few of the coefficients are statistically significant. 
That could help reduce complexity and be used to estimate a Cobb-Douglas model. However, a t-
test, which sets all additional coefficients of a translog specification equal to zero, rejects the null 
hypothesis. The likelihood ratio test finds a significant difference between the two models, which 
speaks in favor of the more flexible translog model. Among the environmental variables of interest, 
all five revenue characteristics are significant. While the expenditures through earmarked funds, 
transfers, and debt yield the expected positive sign (i.e. they affect efficiency negatively), tax 
progressivity and complexity are associated with less inefficiency. Since only marginal effects can be 
interpreted, Figure 2 illustrates the respective values. They indicate by what percentage the input 
requirement changes due to an increase of the respective environmental variable by one unit.12 In 
line with Kumbhakar and Sun (2013), we also find that their marginal effects fall short of the ones 
proposed by Wang (2002) in absolute terms; for the sake of being cautious, we discuss the more 
conservative values of Kumbhakar and Sun.  
As for the expenditures through earmarked funds, increasing them by 1,000 Swiss francs per 
capita demands on average 5.4 percent more inputs. This effect accelerates as the earmarked fund 
expenditures rise, though it stabilizes at around 14 percent when the initial level of expenditures 
through earmarked funds amounts to 800 Swiss francs per capita. 
The estimated effects of tax progressivity and complexity runs counter to our expectations. 
Increasing progressivity, from an index value of 3.4 to 9.4, by one, reduces inefficiency by 4.8 
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percent, on average. Likewise, increasing the complexity of the tax system by one standard 
deviation (+7.60) cuts inefficiency, on average, by 5.1 percent. 
Figure 2 – Marginal effects of the revenue characteristics of full model (I) 
Expenditures through special financing                 Progressivity of the tax system 
Tax complexity       Transfers as share of total revenue 
Debt per capita 
 In support of the flypaper effect hypothesis, additional transfers of 1,000 Swiss francs per capita 
enhance inefficiency by 3.1 percent, on average. Debt illusion also seems to play a role, since 6,207 
(one standard deviation) Swiss francs of additional debt translate on average into 2.8 percent more 
inefficiency. 
We contrast these results with those of various robustness checks (see Figure 3 in the appendix). 
Overall, and most importantly, all robustness checks support our initial findings. Model (II) re-
estimates Model (I) using the TRE estimator (Greene 2005). The mean marginal effect of the 
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Yet, the two methods for calculating marginal effects produce more divergent results than the 
baseline model. Using the Cobb-Douglas specification (Model III), the average marginal effect 
amounts to 1.9 percent. Next, we account for the possibility that some of our controls might actually 
be outcomes themselves, and we drop them in Model (IV). The marginal effect of the expenditures 
through earmarked funds averages 3.6 percent. Model (V) re-estimates the baseline model 
including year fixed effects among the regressors of the frontier. The mean marginal effect of 
expenditures through earmarked funds jumps to 7.7 percent. We replace the variable of main 
interest by one that captures withdrawals from and deposits into earmarked funds. Since these 
transactions are more related to earmarked revenues than expenditures, and hence to external 
factors, we expect no effect on inefficiency. Indeed, the coefficient is not significant and 
economically negligible: increasing the deposits (reducing the withdrawals) by 1,000 Swiss francs 
per capita enhances inefficiency by 0.6 percent. 
In two final tests, we twice employ algorithm #2 of the two-step approach, as proposed by Simar 
and Wilson (2007).13 The first stage estimates the bias-corrected efficiency scores based on data 
envelopment analysis (DEA)14 and the second stage runs a truncated regression of the 
environmental variables on the efficiency scores with bootstrapped standard errors. The non-
parametric DEA differs fundamentally from stochastic frontier analysis, as it imposes no functional 
form a priori on the frontier while attributing the entire deviation from the frontier to inefficiency 
but not to stochastic noise (Cooper, Seiford, and Tone 2007). Instead of assuming a specific 
functional form of the frontier, DEA actually makes it possible to test the returns to scale (Simar and 
Wilson 2002). According to the test result, the more flexible but slower converging variable returns 
to scale specification is necessary.15  
While Model (VII) uses the full set of inputs and outputs for the first step, Model (VIII) follows 
Wilson (2018) and reduces the dimensionality to two for the sake of estimation efficiency. Usually, 
the two-step approach uses efficiency as dependent variable, which is why the coefficient has an 
inverse sign compared to the models above. A positive coefficient stands for a positive effect on 
efficiency and vice-versa. While this characteristic is valid for Model (VII), it does not hold true for 
Model (VIII). The latter regresses the environmental variables on the inverse efficiency, i.e. the 
Shephard distance measure, in the second step due to convergence issues. The sign of the 
coefficient therefore corresponds to those in the SFA models; however, the coefficient’s value can 
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hardly be intuitively interpreted. In line with our hypothesis, the estimated coefficient in Model (VII) 
is negative and statistically significant.16 As the model is linear, the coefficient can be interpreted 
directly. As expenditures rise using earmarked funds of 1,000 Swiss francs per capita, it leads to a 
17.4 percent fall in efficiency. In other words, after expenditures rise, the canton should reduce its 
inputs by 17.4 percent while leaving output production at the same level in order to be fully efficient. 
Model (VIII) supports the robustness of this result with its significant and positive coefficient related 
to expenditures by earmarked funds. Overall, the positive effect on inefficiency found previously is 
supported by the two-step approach. 
Conclusion 
Given that the literature lacks consensus over whether earmarked revenues should be considered 
beneficial or detrimental to efficiency, this paper introduces a new point of view centered around 
debate prevention. According to this view, earmarking negatively affects efficiency in that it reduces 
supervision among and between ministers on the governing council. Without the incentive to control 
their colleagues’ work, the spending ministers can segregate a part of the government budget, and 
this leads to an inefficient provision of services.  
Debate prevention theory adds to the fiscal illusion literature that considers revenue characteristics 
to explain efficiency in providing public services in general, and transport infrastructure in particular. 
It thus offers a compeling rationale to the expectations and to the empirical evidence that, alongside 
traditional factors like debt, transfer funding, tax complexity or progressivity, earmarking negatively 
affects efficiency. 
We use the stochastic frontier analysis to combine several inputs and outputs into an inefficiency 
measure, one that can also be explained by certain environmental variables. We checked the 
robustness of our finding with a non-parametric two-step approach based on data envelopment 
analysis. Swiss cantonal data of road infrastructure provided the data, which covers twenty-one of the 
twenty-six cantons from 2000 to 2016. 
The results show the expected negative effect of earmarking on efficiency of the road construction 
and maintenance. The estimates support the debate prevention theory. They also put into perspective 
previous findings arguing that earmarking had no effect on the expenditures (Nesbit and Kreft 2009; 
Dye and McGuire 1992). On average, additional expenditures through earmarked funds of 1,000 Swiss 
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francs lead to an increase of input requirements by 5.4 percent. Previous studies mentioned a 
crowding out effect to explain the absence of a significant coefficient. However, this explanation is not 
valid in the Swiss case due to the specific definition of special financing (see Section 4) (Nesbit and 
Kreft 2009). As a matter of fact, the data used here provide an interesting opportunity to disentangle 
crowding out effects from the actual effects earmarking has on efficiency.  
Regarding other revenue characteristics, the coefficients are relatively stable and robust, and usually 
significant. The effect of transfers and debt are in line with the expectations. On the contrary, tax 
progressivity and complexity are positively associated with efficiency meaning that they do not create 
fiscal illusion in the investigated area. 
Our study is limited by its relatively narrow focus on the assessment of technical efficiency, even 
though earmarking also affects budget allocations. Accordingly, these results do not comment on any 
possible contingent increase or loss in social welfare due to earmarked funds. Moreover, the study 
proposes a possible mechanism through which earmarking might affect efficiency. At the same time, 
it cannot exclude other channels that could potentially lead to the same outcome. 
Furthermore, the applied methodological approaches cannot exclude endogeneity between 
environmental variables and efficiency.17 One might argue that the parliament installs earmarked 
funds with the intention to control and discipline an existing inefficient behaviour of the executive. In 
this case, the causality would run in the opposite direction of that claimed in the debate prevention 
theory. Yet, two arguments work against reverse causality. First, the cantonal parliaments in 
Switzerland cannot influence the expenditure variations of earmarked funds but only their initial setup 
or cancellation. Hence, if the parliament were reacting on an inefficient behaviour of the executive, 
we would observe frequent setups and cancellations of earmarked funds which is not the case. 
Second, data about earmarked funds shows that the correlation coefficient of the expenditures by 
earmarked funds and the earmarked funds count is rather low. This means that expenditure variation 
comes from external (and exogenous) sources such as a higher fuel demand which mainly contributes 
to the earmarked fund to construct roads. 
We see two prominent paths toward deepening knowledge in the field of earmarked funding and 
efficiency. First, as the stochastic frontier analysis is highly data-driven, the number of observations 
should be dramatically increased in order to enhance the power of the estimations. Second, the effect 
found could be domain-specific, since the ministries of transport engage in some of the largest special 
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financing of all policy areas in the Swiss cantons. Other domains might then be different with respect 
to the transparency of the services provided and therefore show deviant effects. In consequence, 




Table 1 – Estimation results 
True fixed effects 
model(I) 
True random 
effects model (II) 
Cobb -Douglas (III) No control variables 
(IV) 








I1: operational expenditure -0.152*** (0.043) -0.175*** (0.027) -0.131*** (0.047) -0.148*** (0.045) -0.150*** (0.024) -0.139*** (-0.139) 
I2: capital expenditure 0.015 (0.023) 0.013 (0.025) -0.012 (0.037) 0.000 (0.030) -0.035 (0.034) 0.009 (0.009) 
I22 0.169*** (0.063) 0.162*** (0.044)  0.145** (0.070) 0.156*** (0.041) 0.178** (0.178) 
I32 0.032 (0.051) 0.046 (0.036) 0.029 (0.050) -0.004 (0.047) 0.039 (0.039) 
I2 x I3 -0.070 (0.062) -0.106** (0.053) -0.048 (0.072) -0.057 (0.066) -0.113 (-0.113) 
O1: road length (in km) -0.507* (0.277) 0.116*** (0.039) -0.182 (0.452) -0.504* (0.272) -0.393 (0.296) -0.640** (-0.640) 
O2: number of vehicles  -0.030 (0.029) -0.016 (0.023) -0.056** (0.022) 0.002 (0.034) -0.041 (0.034) 0.003 (0.003) 
O3: accidents due to low road quality 
(index: few [0] to many [100]) 
0.535 (0.332) 0.824* (0.439) 0.322** (0.130) 1.194* (0.624) 0.777* (0.454) 0.792** (0.792) 
O12 -0.338 (0.220) -0.265*** (0.028) 0.246 (0.270) -0.063 (0.240) -0.225 (-0.225) 
O22 -0.029 (0.040) -0.014 (0.032) -0.096** (0.047) -0.011 (0.026) -0.040 (-0.040) 
O32 0.529 (1.320) -0.453 (1.402) 2.096 (1.686) 2.792* (1.438) -0.644 (-0.644) 
O1 x O2 0.017 (0.067) 0.000 (0.056) 0.004 (0.080) -0.068 (0.075) -0.039 (-0.039) 
O1 x O3 -0.144 (0.399) -0.544 (0.667) -0.313 (0.755) -0.413 (0.470) -0.797* (-0.797) 
O2 x O3 -0.272 (0.394) -0.439 (0.469) -0.521 (0.497) 0.315 (0.331) -0.190 (-0.190) 
I2 x O1 0.007 (0.060) -0.005 (0.048) 0.034 (0.063) 0.031 (0.054) 0.035 (0.035) 
I2 x O2 -0.016 (0.046) -0.001 (0.040) -0.046 (0.057) -0.030 (0.037) -0.031 (-0.031) 
I2 x O3 0.065 (0.249) 0.089 (0.319) 0.377 (0.283) 0.147 (0.186) -0.109 (-0.109) 
I3 x O1 -0.059 (0.047) -0.035 (0.048) -0.073 (0.066) -0.077 (0.048) -0.066 (-0.066) 
I3 x O2 0.062** (0.030) 0.063* (0.037) 0.081* (0.042) 0.072*** (0.027) 0.082** (0.082) 
I3 x O3 -0.021 (0.176) 0.101 (0.209) -0.177 (0.217) -0.208 (0.176) 0.069 (0.069) 
intercept (𝛼𝛼0) -0.389*** (0.030) 
Notes: I = inputs; O = outputs; TFE = true fixed effects; TRE = true random effects, coefficients with robust standard errors clustered at cantonal level; the dependent variable is the logged personnel expenditures; all 
variables of the frontier are in logarithms and normalized by their mean value; * p=90%, ** p=95%, *** p=99%; the first group indicates the 𝛽𝛽 (inputs; I) and 𝛼𝛼 (output; O) coefficients; the second group shows the delta 
coefficients (𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜹𝜹′𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖); the third group lists the signal-to-noise ratio 𝜆𝜆 and its ingredients. 
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Table 1 – Estimation results (continued) 
True fixed effects 
model(I) 
True random effects 
model (II) 
Cobb -Douglas (III) No control variables 
(IV) 







Expenditures by earmarked funds (in 
kCHF per capita)  
0.163** (0.074) 0.184*** (0.057) 0.213* (0.120) 0.221*** (0.078) 0.239*** (0.089) -0.174*** (0.032) 11.951*** (3.060)
Lagged expenditures through earmarked 
fund  
deposits to and withdrawals from 
earmarked fund (in kCHF per capita) 
0.155 (0.155) 
Tax progressivity (curvature parameter)  -0.115*** (0.032) -0.139*** (0.040) -0.090* (0.050) -0.057* (0.029) -0.064 (0.044) -0.171 (-0.171) 0.018* (0.011) -2.097* (0.885)
Tax complexity (normalized HHI) -0.014*** (0.002) -0.017*** (0.004) -0.012*** (0.004) -0.002 (0.006) -0.010** (0.004) -0.013*** (-0.013) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.006 (0.116)
Transfers (in kCHF per capita) 0.103*** (0.024) 0.078* (0.042) 0.125 (0.112) 0.189** (0.087) 0.159* (0.085) 0.066** (0.066) -0.055*** (0.016) -0.828 (1.305)
Gross debt (in kCHF per capita) 0.016** (0.007) 0.045*** (0.013) 0.038*** (0.014) 0.034*** (0.009) 0.010 (0.012) 0.035* (0.035) -0.017*** (0.003) -0.014 (0.283)
GDP (in kCHF per capita) 0.005 (0.004) -0.006** (0.003) -0.002 (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) -0.009* (-0.009) -0.003* (0.002) 0.208 (0.155)
Referendum (1 [hard] to 6 [easy]) 0.049 (0.033) 0.109*** (0.031) 0.028 (0.048) 0.011 (0.024) 0.031 (0.031) -0.007 (0.015) 0.721 (1.298)
Participation rate in polls (in percent) 0.000 (0.000) -0.004* (0.003) 0.000* (0.000) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.021 (0.082)
Foreigners (in % of total inhabitants) -0.033* (0.017) -0.062** (0.025) -0.047** (0.020) 0.010 (0.008) -0.056 (-0.056) 0.022*** (0.005) -0.353 (0.362)
Non-cantonal streets (in m per km2) 0.333*** (0.088) 0.297*** (0.063) 0.193*** (0.060) 0.022 (0.038) 0.437** (0.437) -0.546 (0.474) -78.349 (70.004)
Executive party orientation (left [1] to 
right [10]) 
0.006 (0.040) 0.004 (0.087) -0.060 (0.110) 0.009 (0.038) 0.050 (0.050) -0.013 (0.016) -3.604*** (1.333)
Right parties in legislative (in %) 0.056 (0.159) 0.003 (0.002) 0.283 (0.288) 0.000 (0.001) 0.053 (0.053) -0.114 (0.080) 0.090 (0.071) 
Debt brake (weak [0] to restrictive [3]) -0.059** (0.023) -0.014 (0.023) -0.004 (0.026) -0.040*** (0.015) -0.053 (-0.053) 0.024*** (0.008) -1.131 (0.762)
Intercept (𝛿𝛿0) 0.529 (0.358) 1.432* (0.759) 1.446 (0.900) 0.062 (0.227) 0.295 (0.277) 1.435 (1.435) 
𝔼𝔼[𝜎𝜎�𝑢𝑢]  0.033 (0.030) 0.074** (0.033) 0.068 (0.051) 0.048 (0.044) 0.050 (0.048) 0.061 (0.071) 
𝔼𝔼[𝜎𝜎�𝑣𝑣] 0.076*** (0.009) 0.072*** (0.009) 0.077*** (0.017) 0.080*** (0.013) 0.057** (0.026) 0.069*** (0.020) 
𝔼𝔼�?̂?𝜆� (= 𝔼𝔼[𝜎𝜎�𝑢𝑢] 𝔼𝔼[𝜎𝜎�𝑣𝑣]⁄ ) 0.429*** (0.036) 1.028*** (0.040) 0.874*** (0.066) 0.598*** (0.055) 0.885*** (0.073) 0.878*** (0.090) 
Log-likelihood 376.808 280.543 343.395 347.509 416.706 385.060 
Model TFE TRE TFE TFE TFE TFE DEA (Farrell), Simar-




Time dummies no no no no yes no no no 
N 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 
Notes: I = inputs; O = outputs; TFE = true fixed effects; TRE = true random effects, coefficients with robust standard errors clustered at cantonal level; the dependent variable is the logged personnel expenditures; all 
variables of the frontier are in logarithms and normalized by their mean value; * p=90%, ** p=95%, *** p=99%; the first group indicates the 𝛽𝛽 (inputs; I) and 𝛼𝛼 (output; O) coefficients; the second group shows the delta 
coefficients (𝜇𝜇𝑢𝑢,𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜹𝜹′𝒛𝒛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖); the third group lists the signal-to-noise ratio 𝜆𝜆 and its ingredients. 
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Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable group Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum Data Source 
b 
Inputs Personnel expenditure (in kCHF) 13,332.457 10,955.151 570.413 45,838.516 federal finance administration 
Operational expenditure (in kCHF) 17,980.644 21,901.746 472.451 122,332.886 federal finance administration 
Capital expenditure (in kCHF) 67,952.606 74,283.693 1,314.098 436,857.017 federal finance administration 
Outputs road length (in km) 624.819 614.354 48 2111 federal statistical office 
vehicles (no.) 203,017 218,187.614 9,520 938,520 federal statistical office 
accidents due to low road quality 
(index a) 
96.683 7.326 53.317 100 federal roads office 
Revenue 
characteristics 
Expenditures through special 
financing (in kCHF per capita) 
0.187 0.266 0 1.215 cantonal annual financial 
statements 
Tax progressivity (curvature 
parameter) 
6.197 1.699 3.270 9.399 federal tax administration 
Tax complexity (normalized HHI) 34.664 7.599 17.237 54.118 federal finance administration 
Transfers (in kCHF per capita) 0.643 0.768 0.058 4.975 federal finance administration 
Gross debt per capita (in kCHF per 
capita) 




GDP (in kCHF per capita) 57.892 19.389 39.003 176.513 BAK Basel Economics AG 
Referendum (from 1 [hard] to 6 
[easy]) 
5.013 1.268 2.25 6 mainly federal statistical office 
Participation rate in polls (in 
percent) 
46.305 7.031 27.431 69.262 federal statistical office 
Foreigners (in percent of total 
inhabitants) 
18.916 6.897 7.819 40.984 federal statistical office 
Non-cantonal streets (in meters 
per km2) 
1.736 1.218 0.175 4.661 federal statistical office 
Executive party orientation (left [1] 
to right [10]) 
5.548 0.617 4.22 7.057 federal statistical office 
Right-wing parties in legislative (in 
%) 
0.43 0.144 0 0.646 federal statistical office 
Debt brake (weak [0] to restrictive 
[3]) 
1.092 1.108 0 3 cantonal constitutions and laws 
(Feld and Kirchgässner) 
a Index calculated as 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑏𝑏 ∗ 𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏 with 𝑎𝑎 = 100 + 99 ∗ arg min (𝒚𝒚
𝑏𝑏)
arg max�𝒚𝒚𝑏𝑏� − arg min (𝒚𝒚𝑏𝑏)
 and 𝑏𝑏 = 99
arg max�𝒚𝒚𝑏𝑏� − arg min (𝒚𝒚𝑏𝑏)
 and 𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏 = bad output 
b All data are subject to own calculations based on the data source indicated in the last column 
Notes: Without missing values there should be 442 observations (26 cantons and 17 years); the true N = 337; missing cantons (and years) are 
BS (if year < 2013), VD (all years), TG (all years), TI (2015, 2016) LU (all years), GR (all years), GL (all years), GE (2014 to 2016), VS (2015, 2016) 
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Figures 
Figure 3 – Marginal effects of the expenditures through special financings in different models 
True Random Effects Model (II) Cobb-Douglas (IV) 
No control variables (V) Time dummies (VI) 
Deposits and withdrawals (VII) 
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Figure 4 – Accounting scheme of earmarked funds 
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Endnotes 
1. For a discussion of how monitoring potentially disciplines the ministers see Nagin et al. (2002).
2. Formally, a production function that is homogenous of degree one in inputs satisfies the following
condition:
𝑦𝑦 ∗ 𝜆𝜆𝛾𝛾 = 𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥1𝛾𝛾, 𝑥𝑥2𝛾𝛾, … , 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛𝛾𝛾) . If 𝛾𝛾 = 1 , which is not assumed here, the proportional increase in
outputs is the same as the proportional increase in inputs and the production function has constant
returns to scale.
3. Note that the required identification constraints to satisfy the homogeneity property are different
for the Cobb-Douglas and the translog specification. Kumbhakar (2012) discusses them extensively.
4. Using an input rather than an output-oriented distance function is justified by the discretionary
power of the administration. Production analyses in the public sector usually estimate input-oriented
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efficiencies, because the outputs are usually fixed by law, and the administration strongly influences 
the expenditures (Seifert and Nieswand 2014). 
5. While Wang (2002) calculates marginal effects based on a post-truncation mean of inefficiency, i.e.
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗|𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗>0)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
, Kumbhakar and Sun (2013) condition on the entire error term, i.e. 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕(𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗|𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗)
𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
. 
6. Since accidents are an undesirable variable, it enters here in the transformed form as index (see
Table 2).
7. Of course, different understandings are possible. For a classification of different types of earmarked
funds see Bird and Jun (2005). According to their typology, earmarked revenue as we present it would
be categorized as substantive earmarking, where an increase in earmarked revenues has a direct effect
on the special fund or the linked expenditures.
8. The nHHI is defined as 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = �(∑ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 ) − 1/𝑁𝑁� /(1 − 1/𝑁𝑁). See Pommerehne and Schneider
(1978) who used Swiss data in a similar way in an early empirical paper on the subject.
9. The tax progressivity parameter 𝑎𝑎 results as an estimate when fitting a logarithmic function into a
xy-plane that plots the tax rate 𝑡𝑡 against income 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 . The logarithmic function reads as 𝑡𝑡(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) = 𝑎𝑎 ∗
ln(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) + 𝑏𝑏.
10. Some studies (da Cruz and Marques 2014; Geys, Heinemann, and Kalb 2010) use population
density to control for scale effects. However, this variable is strongly correlated (0.89) with the federal
road variable. Accordingly, we included only the latter to avoid collinearity.
11. Estimates are based on Stata’s sfpanel command (Belotti et al. 2015). Marginal effects are based
on our own calculations.
12. Due to convergence problems in the bootstrap replications, we cannot report confidence intervals
for the marginal effects as proposed by Kumbhakar and Sun (2013).
13. Applying the simarwilson command in Stata (Badunenko and Tauchmann 2019), we use the
following specifications: Input oriented with variable returns to scale; 200 replications for the bias
correction and 2000 replications for the bootstrap to estimate standard errors.
14. Spearman’s rank correlation between the efficiency scores of the baseline model and the ones
from DEA comes only to 0.2. But the test that the two efficiency estimates are independent is rejected
at the 99% level.
15. The ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐-statistic is estimated using the heterogenous bootstrap with 2000 replications.
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16. The same estimation with the constant returns to scale specification yields rather different
coefficients with inversed signs for the variables of interest. Since this specification is wrong according
to the ?̂?𝑆2𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑐𝑐-test (see Footnote 15), we are not worried about this difference.
17. Recent developments in SFA allow implementing instrumental variables to overcome endogeneity
issues. In particular, they drop the assumption of an uncorrelated inefficiency term with the stochastic
noise. Increasing the model flexibility this way potentially alters the results dramatically (Kutlu, Tran,
and Tsionas 2019).
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